Great American Indemnity Company v. W. S. Berryessa and Frank Berryessa : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Great American Indemnity Company v. W. S.
Berryessa and Frank Berryessa : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Howell, Stine and Olmstead; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Great American Indemnity Co. v. Berryessa, No. 7680 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1490
7680 
- ..... "1."!'""". ": D t l L ~ w 
Case No. 7680 AUG 2 l i9t>'l 
---c1;;k-.-s~~r-~;;e-c~~;~~·-i -----tab 
In the Supre~ne Court 
of the State of Utah 
GREAT AMERICAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. S. BERRYESSA and FRANK BERRYESSA, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
W. B. Berryessa . 
.I.O.W88U P81aflae ce.,etela. 8TAM 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page No. 
STATE·MENT OF FACTS ........ --------------------------------------·· 1 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I- THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
PER1IITTING DEFENDANT TO 
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUES-
TION : ------------------------------------------------··-·--·-·----------------· 1 
"Q Now, Mr. Berryessa, I come back to this 
June 6th meeting with Mr. Hagman and the 
occasion for you having signed the $4800 
note, Exhibit A, and ask you if you would 
have signed the note had it not been for the 
statements made by Mr. Hagman on that 
occasion~'' ( Tr. 26) 
and similar questions propounded to the 
defendant. ( Tr. 26 and 27) ------------------------·-········-· 1 
POINT II - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
APPELLANT TO INTRODUCE EXHIB-
IT I, THE SAME BEING A LETTER 
W R I T T E N BY DEFENDANT TO 
PLAINTIFF, (Tr. 51), WHICH SAID 
OFFER WAS RENEWED IN THE AB-
SENCE OF THE JURY (Tr. 55 ) ........................ 14 
POINT III - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
AS TO THE NOTE SUED UPON ........................ 17 
POINT IV - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
M 0 T I 0 N FOR DISMISSAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTER-CLAIM .................. 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page No. 
POINT V - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN THE GIVING OF ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS 1 AND 6 ____________________________________ 23 
POINT VI - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE 
SAID INSTRUCTIONS AS REQUESTED 
BY PLAINTIFF ------------------------------------------------------31 
POINT VII - THE LOWER COURT DID 
NOT E1RR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT AND FOR 
A NEW TRIAL ... -----------------------------------------------------36 
CONCLUSION -----------.-----------------------------------------------------------36 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Ballard v. Burton (Vt.) 24 A. 769 _______________________________________ J1 W 
Brane v. First National Bank (Kan.) 20 
p. ( 2) !506 ________________________________________________________________________ 26 
Buck v. Paw First National Bank (Mich.) 27 
Mich. 293,15 Am. Rep. 189 ____________________________________________ 28 
Clark v. Mosier (S.D.) 54, 150 N. W. 475 ________________________ 12 
Daum v. U rquart ( S. D.) 249 N. W. 738 ____________________________ 12 
Ellison v. Pingree 64 U tab 468, 231 P. 826 ________________________ 18 
Fox v. Piercey, ________________ Utah ----------·-----, 227 
p. ( 2) 7 63 ________________________________________________________________________ 18 
Harris v. Ogden Steam Laundry Co., 39 Utah 
436, 117 p. 700________________________________________________________________ 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page No. 
Henry v. State Bank of Laurens (Ia.) 107 N. W. 
1034 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------35 
Kirkland v. Benjamin (Ark.) 55 S. W. 840 ____________________ 28 
:Meyer v. Guardian Trust Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 
296 F. 789 .. ------------------------------ __________ ------------------------------21 
Ogden v. Ford (Calif.) 176 P. 165 ________________________________________ 28 
Payson Building & Loan Society v. Taylor, et al, 
87 Utah 302, 48 P. (2) 894 ________________________________________ 9, 17 
St. Paul :Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Guntzburger (Minn.) 271 N. W. 478 ____________________________________________________ 13 
Simon Newman Co. v. Woods, et ux (Calif.) 
259 P. 460·----------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Swinburne v. Dahms (Ohio) 162 N. E. 776 ________________________ 28 
United State Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Charles, 
et al (Ala.) 31 So. 558 ____________________________________________________ 28 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell (Tex.) 
44 s. w. 27 4 .... ----------------------------------------------------------------11 
TEXTS CITED 
7 Am. J ur., Bills & Notes, page 270, page 968 .......... 19, 35 
17 Am. Jur., Duress & Undue Influence, page 906 .......... 21 
20 Am. J ur., Evidence, page 643·--·------------------------------------11 
53 Am. J ur., Trial, page 458, 460, 439, 444 ____________ 30, 32, 33 
1 Brick. Dig., Page 382, Sec. 116 10 C. J. S., 
Bills & Notes, page 630, page 628 ____________ 10, 19, 28, 35 
11 C. J. S., Bill & Notes, page 219 ____________________________________ 21 
·, 
/ 
32 C. J. S., Evidence, page 101. ___________________________________________ 10 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (c), Rule 
8 (c) ( 2) -----·----------------------------------·---------------------------27' 28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Suprem.e Court 
of the State of Utah 
GREAT AMERICAN INDEJ\IfNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff ood Appellant, 
vs. 
W. S. BERRYESSA and FRANK BERRYESSA, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This being an action at law in which a jury in the 
lower court has rendered its verdict, if there is any sub-
stantial evidence to support the verdict this court will 
not interfere, even though in its judgment, if it were to 
pass on the facts, the verdict would have been otherwise, 
or is, in its opinion against the weight of the evidence. 
As this court has succinctly stated in the case of Harris 
v. Ogden Steam Laundry Company 39 Utah 436, 117 P. 
700, and has in substance reiterated many times: 
"We cannot interfere in cases that are doubt-
ful with regard to the facts any more than we 
can in cases that are clear upon the facts. The 
test is as to whether there is any substantial 
evidence upon every material issue which must 
be established in order to authorize a recovery. 
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If there is, we, like the losing party in the case, 
must submit to the verdict, although like he, we 
might think it should have been the other way.'' 
We accordingly restate the facts in accordance with 
the evidence most favorable to the defendant, as it was 
the prerogative of the jury to believe such evidence, 
rather than possibly conflicting evidence offered by 
plaintiff. 
Respondent, W. S. Berryessa, is the father of Frank 
Berryessa. Frank was an office employee of the Ben 
Lomond Hotel in Ogden. Plaintiff had issued a surety 
bond guaranteeing the integrity of Frank. In the fore~ 
part of January, 1950, the hotel discovered a shortage 
in Frank's accounts. Frank notified his father and 
W. S. Berryessa went to the hotel and met with I. F. 
Keller, the hotel auditor. It was then assumed that the 
shortage was in the cash account only, and amounted to 
$2,186.00. So far there is no dispute as to the facts. 
At this point, however, plaintiff in his statement of 
facts says: 
''The defendant stated that he was prepared 
to make good any and all losses and was very 
insistent on keeping the matter quiet and notre-
porting it to the bonding company * * *. Defend-
ant insisted on signing a note to the Hotel Com-
pany for the amount of the assumed shortage, 
aggregating $2,000.00. '' 
We call the court's attention, however, to the de-
fendant's precise testimony in regard to this matter: 
Q. (By Mr. Young) And didn't you at that 
time say to Mr. Keller in substance and effect, 
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''I don't want you to even tell the bonding com-
pany about this shortage''? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. And didn't you say, "If you won't tell 
the bonding company about this matter, I'll pay 
every cent of that shortage"? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Either in substance or effect? 
A. No, sir. 
(Tr. 32-33). 
A little later ~Ir. Berryessa went to the office of 
:Jfr. Campbell Eccles, manager of the Hotel, and there 
signed a note payable to the Hotel in the principal 
amount of Two Thousand One Hundred Eighty-six 
($2,186.00) Dollars, which was the then assumed amount 
of the shortage. The circumstances surrounding the 
signing of this note, as testified to by defendant under 
cross-examination, are as follows: 
A. I signed the note with the understanding 
that was the full amount that was short and that 
the bonding company wouldn't be notified. Mr. 
Eccles told me the bonding company wouldn't be 
notified. I could straighten up that shortage and 
Frank would be able to work out and pay that 
back. That was the understanding I had. He 
said that it would he kept quiet. It wouldn't be 
advertised, and that was the reason I signed that 
note. 
Q. Yes. In other words, you at that time 
asked Mr. Eccles not to notify the bonding com-
pany of this shortage. 
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A. I didn't ask him. He offered that. 
( Tr. 34-35). 
Later the hotel auditor determined from an examin-
ation of the ledger accounts that the amount of the 
shortage totaled in excess of $6,000, and at that time 
Mr. Berryessa again met with Mr. Keller, the hotel 
auditor, and Mr. Eccles, the hotel manager. In this 
connection plaintiff in its statements of facts makes 
the following observation as being the fact: 
''However, defendant insisted that whatever the 
amount, he was prepared to make it good". 
We again call the court's attention to the testimony of 
Mr. Berryessa with regard to that matter. 
Q. And didn't you then say in substance and 
effect, I don't want any publicity given to this 
matter. I'll pay every cent of it. 
A. No sir; I didn't say that. That is im-
possible. I knew I couldn't pay that. 
Q. You didn't make a statement either to 
that effect either to Mr. Eccles or Mr. Keller. 
A. It was never brought up for me to pay 
that amount. 
(Tr. 35). 
Mr. Eccles thereupon advised Mr. Berryessa that 
in view of the large amount of the shortage it. would be 
neeessary that the bonding company be notified, whioh 
he did through the bonding company's representative 
Mr. Hagman. Subsequent meetings with Mr. Hagman 
were held, at one of which, namely, March 3, 1950, Mr. 
Hagman received from Frank Berryessa a written state--
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ment acknowledging his misappropriation of a total of 
Six Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-five and 28j100 
($6,865.28) Dollars (Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
Later Frank requested his father to accompany him 
to a meeting with l\Ir. Hagman in Mr. Hagman's office 
in Salt Lake City, and at that time Mr. Hagman and 
Frank discussed the signing of a note, which note would 
bear not only Frank's signature, but that of hi's father, 
:Mr. Berryessa, and his brother-in-law, Roy Patterson. 
l\Ir. Hagman prepared such a note which called for quar-
terly payments of Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars. 
Frank took the note with him and mailed it to his bro-
ther-in-law Roy Patterson in New Mexico, but Patter-
son returned the note unsigned. (Tr. 18-19). There-
after and early in June, apparently on June 4, 1950, 
Frank and his- father, this defendant, again went to Mr. 
Hagman's office in Salt Lake City, at which time Frank 
advised Mr. Hagman that Patterson had sent the note 
back unsigned. Mr. Hagman wanted Mr. Berryessa 
to sign the note, but Mr. Berryessa refused. The de-
fendant then testified {Tr. 21) that upon Mr. Berry-
essa 's refusal to sign the note ''Mr. Hagman got angry 
and swore, and pounded his desk with his fist, and said 
'You can't come here and tell me what you will do' ". 
Mr. Berryessa thereupon told Mr. Hagman that it was 
impossible for them to meet quarterly payments of 
$250, and in response to a question propounded by Mr. 
Hagman stated that payments of $50 a month could be 
made. Mr. Hagman then told Mr. Berryessa that at 
$50 a month it would take forever to pay off the full 
amount of the shortage, but that if Mr. Berryessa would 
pay $2,000 in cash and thereby reduce the amount to 
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$4,865.20, a note co-signed by Mr. Berryessa in that 
amount and payable in $50 monthly installments would 
be accepted. Mr. Berryessa thereupon agreed to pay 
$2,000, and co-sign with Frank upon the note in the 
amount of $4,865.20, which is the note here sued upon. 
Further in regard to his agreement to sign this note and 
make the $2,000 cash payment, Mr. Berryessa testified 
(Tr. 21) as follows: 
''Mr. Hagman told me if we would sign the 
note and I would make that payment that he 
wouldn't prosecute Frank, but if I didn't he 
would have to prosecute him.'' 
(Tr. 21-22). 
Apparently on the next day, June 5, 1950, Mr. Hag-
man caused the note to be prepared and forwarded the 
same to Mr. Berryessa in Ogden, and Mr. Berryessa 
signed the note on June 6 and returned it to Mr. Hag-
man. He did not have the $2,000, but took immediate 
steps to raise the same by borrowing upon some prop-
erty he had. Because of other expenses he succeeded 
in having but $1,500 of the $2,000 he had agreed to pay. 
He got a cashier's check in the amount of $1,500, which 
he delivered to Mr. Hagman on or about July 3, 1950. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2), at that time explaining why 
he was $500 short. To make up this shortage he de-
livered to Mr. Hagman his personal check in the amount 
of $500, but asked Mr. Hagman to delay presenting it 
for payment for a reasonable time to permit him to raise 
the money to cover it, and Mr. Hagman agreed to this 
arrangement. The $500 check was never presented for 
payment and was in possession of defendant at the time 
the action was brought. (Defendant's Exhibit 3). Sub-
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sequently, :Mr. Berryessa saw 1\Ir. Hagman on two or 
three occasions primarily in connection with payments 
upon the note between the time that the note was signed 
in June, 1950, and the bringing of this action in Decem-
ber, 1950. FiYe $50 payments were made thereon, one 
by ~Ir. Berryessa out of his own funds, and the other 
four payments out of funds received by him from 
Frank's wife. These five payments constituted the in-
stallment payments due for July, August, September, 
October and November. The installment payment due 
on December 1st was not made, and in December plain-
tiff purportedly elected to mature the entire principal, 
because of such default, and brought this action for the 
full amount of such note, less the payments that had 
been made thereon. 
Defendant defended upon the ground that the note 
was void as his signature thereon was obtained by du-
ress, and that the note was not supported by any lawful 
consideration. He counter-claimed against the plain-
tiff for the return of the $1,500 he had paid, and the 
return of his $500 check, and upon the jury's verdict in 
his favor judgment was entered by the court in favor 
of the defendant upon the note and for the return by 
plaintiff to defendant of the $1,500 paid and the $500 
check. 
As further bearing upon the circumstances under 
which the note was signed, the $500 check delivered, 
and the $1,500 paid, Mr. Berryessa testified that he 
would not have signed the note but for the statements 
and threats made by Mr. Hagman as to what would 
happen to Frank if he did not do so, nor would he have 
paid the $1,500 or given his $500 check but for such 
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per,son for a felony, or under threats of arrest or 
prosecution, would be void as against public 
policy.'' 
And generally, 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, Page 630: 
"Bills and notes for the concealment of a 
crime or the suppression or hindering of a crim-
inal prosecution are against public policy and can-
not be enforced between the immediate parties, 
whether the maker was innocent or guilty. If 
an agreement not to prosecute criminally forms 
any part of the consideration, it is immaterial 
that there was an existing indebtedness which 
could have been a consideration for the instru-
ment, as where the bill or note was given for 
money embezzled or stolen by the maker.'' 
Plaintiff's particular point here is that the court 
erred in permitting the defendant to testify that he 
would not have signed the note or paid the money but 
for plaintiff's threats and promises, because it called 
for a conclusion of the witness. 
As the court well recognizes, the line of demar-
cation between a fact and a conclusion is often difficult 
of discernment, and, in the last analysis, every state-
ment of fact is to some extent founded on inference or 
induction. As stated in 32 C.J.S., Evidence, Page 101, 
''Much effort is expended during the trial 
of causes to confine the testimony of witnesses 
to statements of what they saw, heard, or other-
wise observed, as distinguished from the inferen-
ces or opinions formed as a result of such obser-
vations. The distinction is, however, one which 
it is in many cases impossible to draw for the 
reason that the most simple statement of fact 
involves -an element of coordination induction 
' ' 10 
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or inference, the fact and the inference being 
frequently so blended that they cannot be separ-
ated. The modern tendency is to regard it as 
more important to get the truth of the matter 
than to quibble over distinctions which are in 
many cases impracticable, and a witness is per-
mitted to state a fact known to or observed by 
him even though his statement involves a certain 
element of inference.'' 
And again in 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Page 643 : 
''The general rule excluding opinions of wit-
nesses is simple in statement, but not so simple 
in application, for it is not always easy to dis-
tinguish in the testimony of a witness facts within 
his knowledge or observation from his opinions 
on facts. As a general rule, a witness may testify 
directly to a composite fact, although in a sense 
his testimony may include his conclusions from 
other facts. In the multitudinous affairs of 
everyday life, it is extremely difficult to distin-
guish between 'opinion' on the· one hand and 
'fact' or 'knowledge' on the other. Moreover, 
objections that proposed testimony states a con-
clusion only are sometimes pushed to captious 
extremes. The true solution seems to he that 
such questions are left for the practical discretion 
of the trial court.'' 
Direct application of the foregoing rules to situa-
tions similar to the present are to be found in the 
cases of Ballard v. Burton (Vt.) 24 .A. 769, wherein 
the court held it proper for a witness to testify what 
he would or would not have done, but for another's pro-
mise; and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mit.chell, 
(Tex.) 44 8. W. 274, wherein it was held proper for 
a witness to testify what he would have done had a 
telegram been delivered to him. 
11 
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More directly in point from a factual standpoint 
is the case of Daum v. Urquart, (8. D.) 249 N. W. 738, 
which involved an action for the recovery of money 
allegedly obtained by duress. In this case the plaintiff, 
while testifying as a witness, was asked if he ''would 
have voluntarily given to the defendant U rquart the 
sum of $7,000 if it had not been for the duress, coercion 
and threats that were given to you there in that office" . 
. The question was objected to on the ground that it in-
vaded the province of the jury. The objection was over-
ruled, and the plaintiff said he would not have done so. 
Error was predicated upon this ruling. The court held 
as follows.: 
"It is the theory of the defense that plain-
tiff admited that he had taken considerable· sums 
of defendant's money and that he desired to make 
restitution, and that it was this desire on his 
part that prompted him to pay the $7,000. It 
was for the purpose of showing what really 
prompted him to pay the money that this ques-
tion was asked. In Clark v. Mosier, 35 S. D. 54, 
150 N. W. 475, we held that this question calls 
for neither a conclusion nor a self-serving dec-
laration, but for a statement of fact. It was for 
the purpose of showing the inducement that 
prompted plaintiff to pay the money. It was 
not binding on the jury and did not prejudice the 
defendant. The jury was free to draw its own 
conclusions as to whether he paid the money be-
cause his will had been overcome by Crawford 
and Carter or whether he was prompted by the 
desire to pay an honest debt.'' 
And Clark v. Mosier (8. D.) 150 N. W. 475: 
12 
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"While on the witness stand, plaintiff was 
asked whether or not he would have released 
the cattle if defendant had not agreed to pay the 
damage. This was objected to on the ground 
that it calls for a conclusion and a self-serving 
declaration of the witness. The objection was 
overruled, and rightly so. The question is not 
objectionable on either of these grounds. It calls 
for neither a conclusion nor a self-serving dec-
laration, but for a statement of fact. That plain-
tiff released the cattle and thereby surrendered 
his lien thereon was an admitted fact; and the 
purpose of the question was to show the indu-
cement that prompted plaintiff to forego such 
security and to show that he acted solely on de-
fendant's promise to pay.'' 
In the case of St. Pool Mercury Indemnity Co. v. 
Guntzburger, (Minn.) 271 N. W. 478, in which the trial 
court found duress, and the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota affirmed, the following was not found improper: 
"And he (Hawkland) handed me the note 
and I refused to sign, and finally says I, 'Now, 
what you going to do if I don't sign that note~' 
'Well,' he says, 'we will turn him over to the 
bonding company, and you know what that 
means.' Says I, 'Yes, I think that means State's 
prison.' And he said 'Yes.' Well, my grandson 
sat right there and (I) looked in his eyes. I 
could see him. He faced me. Mr. Hawkland was 
sitting right about this way from me. And I see 
the tears was running down his (Lowell's) cheeks, 
and that is what got me, and I signed it. I didn't 
want my name dragged in that I have a grandson 
in the State's prison. 
13 
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'Q. And you had been talking about this 
matter, as you say, all through the evening, the 
couple hours that he was there? A. Yes, more or 
less. 
'Q. Now, if this had not been said to you, 
would you have signed that note otherwise, Mr. 
Guntzburger? • • • A. I don't think I would. 
'Q. Is that why you signed the note 1 A. 
That is why I signed the note. · 
'Q. And did you believe that if you did not 
sign it your grandson would be turned over to 
the bonding company and prosecuted and sent to 
prison 1 A. I sure did believe it, that is what 
they would do, and I was thinking of the two 
children he has got and his wife. • • •' ". 
We submit, accordingly, that there was no error in 
the reception of this testimony. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff's second point of argument is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to receive in evidence its 
proffered Exhibit I, although plaintiff's argument is 
limited substantially to the- bare statement that such 
ruling constituted error. We will pursue the matter 
somewhat further. 
It is not, and was not, defendant's contention that 
any duress or coercion entered into the relation of the 
parties to the matter then under investigation prior to 
the meeting in Mr. Hagman's office in early June, 1950, 
and the issues were so framed. The stage was set, how-
ever, long prior to that; for it will be recalled that in 
early March plaintiff's agent, Mr. Hagman, obtained 
14 
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from Frank Berryessa his signed admission of guilt in 
the misappropriation of the hotel's funds. With that 
in his possession Mr. Hagman was in a position to crack 
the whip as and when, in his opinion, circumstances 
dictated. 
He did not do so immediately. The first proposal 
was that the plaintiff company be reimbursed hy way 
of a note to be signed by Frank and co-signed by W. S. 
Berryessa and his son-in-law, Roy Patterson. This 
proposal came from Mr. Hagman at the meeting in his 
office among himself, Mr. Berryessa and Frank on 
April 19th. (Hagman testimony, Tr. 89). Mr. Berry-
essa likewise testified as to this and to the effect that 
at the time this Patterson note was discussed Mr. Hag-
man didn't even inquire if Mr. Berryessa would sign it, 
but was concerned only as to whether Patterson would 
sign. (Tr. 39-40). Mr. Hagman did not deny this, and 
the inference is clear that Mr. Hagman, then having 
Frank's signed admission of guilt, knew he could bend 
Mr. Berryessa to his will at pleasure, hut Patterson, 
being out of the state and in the family only by marriage, 
was a different matter. 
The upshot of it was, of course, that Patterson 
didn't sign the note, and Mr. Hagman was so informed 
at the meeting in early June, on which occasion Mr. 
Berryessa told Mr. Hagman that he wouldn't sign it 
either. Here it was that Mr. Hagman found it expedient 
for the first time to display the iron glove Frank's signed 
confession of guilt had clothed him with. In Mr. Be·rry-
essa 's words, he pounded the table with his fist and 
swore, and said ''You can't come here and tell me what 
you will do". And then, having made his position of 
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dominance clear, he mellowed a little, and was· willing 
to discuss somewhat milder terms of payment and a 
different note, but in connection therewith made it clear 
t.o Mr. Berryessa that if he didn't sign the new note, 
and make the other payments discussed, Frank would 
be criminally prosecuted, but if he did, no prosecution 
would follow. (Tr. 21-54). 
Now, it's against this background that the lette;r 
Exhibit I was offered and refused. This exhibit is a 
letter from Mr. BerryesBa to 1\tir~ Hagman dated May 
22, 1950, and relating to the then. pending_ :Patterson 
note. It. was prior to the time that the exeraise· of any 
dureSB is claimed, and related to. a transaction. that is 
not the· subject of this litigation, and, as a matter of 
fact, was never consummated. 
The only question here involved was whet-Her the 
note of June 6th, which is the subject of this-litigation, 
and whether the payments subsequently made, which 
came out of the June 6th meeting, resulted from duress. 
It was not, accordingly, prejudicial error for the lowel' 
court to exclude evidence tending to show that no duress 
was exercised in connection with the propos-ed Patterson 
note, because no dureSB in connection, ther-ewith is 
claimed. 
It is interesting to note, too, that plaintiff'·s- counsel, 
in connection with his discussion- with the court as to 
the admissability of Exhibi~t I, was laboring· under the 
mistaken impression that the pleadings claime<f duTess 
prior to the early June meeting, but after examining 
the pleadings and satisfying himself of his error in that 
rega.rd, he pursued it no further by argum-ent, lJut sub;. 
mitted it to th~ court. ( Tr. 56-57). 
·In-
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POINT IIL 
Plaintiff's third point is directed toward the- con-
tention that at the conclusion of defendant's evidence 
defendant's defense of duress and lack of consid~ration 
had not been sustained by the evidence. 
At this point, of course, only defendant's evidence 
as to duress and lack of consideration was in, such being 
affirmatiYe defenses as to which defendant had the 
burden. The evidence was uncontradicted, but whether 
it is taken in its uncontradicted state, or in the light of 
conflicts arising through the later testimony of plain-
tiff's witnesses, there was at all times a case for the jury. 
Defendant testified in substance that plaintiff's 
agent told liim' that if he didn't sign the note his son 
Frank would be criminally prosecuted and sent to the 
penitentiary. Bearing in mind that Mr. Hagman then 
had in his possession Frank's signed confession of guilt, 
and, Mr. Berryessa knew he had it, it is apparent that 
1\Ir. Hagman had the power to enforce his threats, and 
Mr. Berryessa had reason to believe such threats would 
be carried out. This factual situation if true-, and it 
was for the jury to find the truth, established duress 
sufficient to invalidate the note under all the decisions. 
We refer again to this court's decision in Payson Build-
ing & Loan Society v. Taylor, supra : 
"The statements made to the defendants that 
Lee R. Taylor would be arrested and imprisoned 
with the consequent disgrace and humiliation that 
would result from such threatened arrest and 
imprisonment was sufficient to put the husband 
and wife in fear and to cause them to act con-
trary to their respective wills and inclinations. 
17 
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Such being the allegations and the proof, ~ case 
of duress is made out sufficient to avoid the 
validity of the' executed instruments.'' 
We have, of course, no quarrel with . the cases of 
Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 P. 826, or Fox v. 
Piercey, _: _____ ~ ____ Utah ____________ , 227 P. (2) 763, upon which 
plaintiff states it relies principally. In the Pingree case 
this court upheld a lower court finding of no duress, 
but Pingree himself had testified that he did not enter 
into the c.ontracts because of any threats. This court 
there observed : 
''In our judgment the district court was 
clearly right in holding that under Mr. Pingree's 
own statements he utterly failed to establish du-
ress as that term is understood and applied by 
the courts. In his testimony he asserted over and 
over again that, stating it in his own language, 
'it wasn't fear of him (Poppenhusen) sending 
me to the penitentiary' that induced him to enter 
into the contracts or either of them, and that 
he was 'not scared' of Mr. Poppenhusen. This 
statement is made so often, and in so many ways, 
that there is absolutely no room for doubt that 
it was not fear of imprisonment or loss of liberty, 
or of any personal injury, violence, or harm that 
induced Mr. Pingree to sign the contracts.'' 
In Fox v. Piercy this court adhered to what it re-
ferred to as the modern rule, as follows: 
"It must appear that the threat or act is of 
such a nature and made under such circumstances 
as to constitute a reasonable and adequate cause 
to control the will of the threatened person.'' 
18 
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The facts of the instant case meet this test. 
Now as to the defense of lack of consideration. For 
immediate purposes, that is, for the question of plain-
tiff's motion for a directed verdict, if the defense of 
duress was good the motion was properly denied irres-
pective of the defense of lack of consideration. We 
submit, however, that the defense of lack of considera-
tion likewise was established. 
Plaintiff's position is stated to be (Page 20 of 
Brief) that the extension of additional time to Frank 
in which to make the payment in and of itself consti-
tuted sufficient consideration for defendant's signing 
the note. We submit that this is not true when, as here 
testified to by the defendant, there is present the pro-
mise tha.t if the note is signed Frank would not be crVm-
inally prosecuted. 
We have heretofore stated the general rule on this 
point as it appears in 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page 
630: 
''If an agreement not to prosecute forms 
any part of the consideration, it is immaterial 
that there was an existing indebtedness. which 
could have been a consideration for the instru-
ment, as where the bill or note was given for 
money embezzled or stolen by the maker." 
See also 7 Am. J ur., Bills and Notes, Page 270, as 
follows: 
''Illegality of consideration for a bill or 
note exists, and the instrument cannot be en-
forced, at least by one not a holder in due course, 
where it is given to conceal, suppress, or com-
pound a public offense, regardless of whether 
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such offense was actually committed, even though 
it is also given in settlement of a civil liability 
from the same act that constitutes the offense, 
for it is well settled that criminal process can-
not he used to collect a private debt. Thus, a 
bill or note given to repay embezzled money in 
~consideration of an agreement, express or im-
plied, to conceal the embezzlement, not to pro-
secute, or to stifle the prosecution is void." 
We submit, accordingly, that the defense of illegal 
consideration was established. The inducement of the 
promise not to prosecute tainted the entire transaction 
with illegality, and the fact that there existed what 
might otherwise have been a valid consideration does 
not remove the taint of illegality. 
POINT IV 
Plaintiff's fourth point is that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to go to the jury upon the question of 
recovery hack of the $1,500 paid by defendant to plain-
tiff, and the $500 check delivered to plaintiff, and, 
accordingly, its motion to dismiss defendant's counter-
claim should have been granted. 
Defendant's right to recover back such money and 
such check stands upon exactly the same footing as his 
liability under the note, for, as we have seen, property 
obtained from another under duress may be recovered. 
It remains only to be seen whether there was any sub-
stantial evidence of duress against defendant on the 
part of plaintiff's agent Hagman in obtaining the $1,500 
and the $500 check. 
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We refer again to the fact that the delivery of this 
money and check, as well as the signing of the note-, grew 
out of the meeting of June 4 with Mr. Hagman, and at 
which meeting, according to defendant's evidence, Hag-
man threatened criminal prosecution and imprisonment 
of Frank if de-fendant didn't sign the note and pay the 
$2,000. Certainly if the $1,500 and the $500 check had 
been delivered to Hagman at that time- there would he 
no doubt but that a case of duress had be-en made out. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that as substantially a 
month had elapsed since the threats no proof of duress 
or coercion at the later date was shown. 
In answer to this we go back to the fundamental 
concept that if there were any facts shown from which 
coercion on this later date might be inferred, it was for 
the jury to determine. 
As stated in 17 Am. J ur., Duress and Undue In-
fluence, Page 906: 
''Whether duress existed in the particular 
transaction is usually a matter of fact.'' 
And in 11 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, Page 219: 
''Duress is generally a question of fact for 
the jury, as is also the question of continuance 
of the duress at a time when a letter of defend-
ant promising payment of the- previously exe-
cuted notes was written, and where there is suf-
ficient evidence in support of a defense of duress, 
a direction of verdict for plaintiff is improper.'' 
The court in the case of Meyer v. Guardian Trust 
Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 296 F. 789, states it thus: 
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''It is quite apparent from the record that 
in the admitted and offered testimony there was 
evidence from which a jury could find that de-
fendant in error assigned said notes because 
of threats that his son would be prosecuted and 
sent to the penitentiary for alleged forgery as 
to the first notes given. Whether AngLis, the 
party making such threats, was or was not the 
agent of the defendant in error, is immaterial 
on this branch of the case. If the mind and will 
to contract of defendant in error was destroyed 
by the threats, and if while in such condition he 
signed the notes, then there was duress. Whether 
or not such was the fact was a question to be 
determined by a jury.'' 
We refer, accordingly, to the factual situation. On 
June 4th Mr. Hagman made the threats. At that time 
he had Frank's signed confession of guilt. Thus he 
then not only made the threats of what would happen 
to Frank if the note was not signed, and the money paid, 
but he had the instrument in his possession (Frank's 
confession) which made it possible for him to carry 
his threats into fulfillment. The power of fulfillment 
whicb he had on June 4th when the threats were made 
he still held on June 6th when the note was signed, 
and on July 4th when the $1,500 was paid and the $500 
check delivered. He had stated once what would happen 
if the note was not signed and the money paid - he 
had the power to carry his threats into execution. It 
was wholly unnecessary for him to repeat his threats. 
Defendant had been once informed, and was not un-
mindful of the consequences. 
Having onee made the threats, and having the 
power to effect the consequenees, we submit that it 
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was wholly a question for the jury as to whether the 
note was signed, the money paid, and the check delivered 
under duress, and the lower court did not err in deny-
ing plaintiff's motion to dismiss. 
The threat here involved was not one of but pas-
sing moment, which disappeared upon removal from 
the immediate presence of the person threating, as 
might be in a case of threatened physical violence. Here 
was a threat which constituted a continuing cloud- an 
ever-present danger. It was as effective when defend-
ant was in Ogden as when he was in Salt Lake. It was 
as ever present on July 4th, as it was on June 6th, and 
on June 4th, when the threats were first made., 
We do not quarrel with decisions reached by other 
juries and other courts on other factual situations, as 
reflected in cases cited by plaintiff. All we say is that 
it was for this jury to decide, and this decision has 
been made. 
POINT V 
Plaintiff's fifth point of argument is that the lower 
court erred in submitting to the jury defendants' de-
fense of illegal consideration under instructions (Instruc-
tions 1 and 6) which in effect told the jury that even 
though they found that the note was not given under 
duress, still if they found that the consideration there-
for was a promise by plaintiff's agent that if the note 
was signed by Mr. Berryessa Frank would not be crim-
inally prosecuted, such consideration was illegal and 
the note invalid as to the defendant W. S. Berryessa. 
The instructions complained of are as follows : 
''Instruction No. 1. 
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You are instructed that the defendant, W. 
S. Berryessa, admits signing the note sued upon 
but raises two defenses to his liability thereon. 
The first defense is that his signature was ob-
tained as a result of the duress upon him of the 
plaintiff's agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., and that 
but for such duress he would not have signed the 
note. The duress as claimed by the defendant 
consisted of threats by plaintiff's agent, J. G. 
Hagman, Jr., that if the defendant, W. S. Berry-
essa, did not sign the note his son, Frank Ber-
ryessa, would be criminally prosecuted and sent 
to jail. The second defense is that even if it 
should be determined that such duress has not 
been proven, nevertheless the only considera-
tion for his signing the note was the promise 
of plaintiff's agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., that if 
he would sign Frank Berryessa would not be 
criminally prosecuted, and that sueh considera-
tion is illegal and insuffieient to support the 
note. You are instructed that either of these 
defenses, if established by preponderance of the 
evidence is a sufficient and adequate defense 
to plaintiff's action against the defendant, W. 
S. Berryessa. '' 
''Instruction No. 6 
You are instructed that the note sued upon by 
the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant, W. 
S. Berryessa, if not supported by a valuable 
consideration. A promissory note given for the 
suppression of a criminal prosecution is against 
public policy and cannot be enforced between 
the parties, and it is immaterial whether the 
individual as to whom the criminal prosecution 
is suppressed was guilty or innocent. Accord-
ingly, if you believe from a preponderance of 
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the evidence that the defendant, W. S. Berry-
essa, signed the note sued upon by the plaintiff 
in consideration of plaintiff's promise through 
its agent, J. G. Hagman, Jr., that Frank Berry-
essa would not be criminally prosecuted for his 
defalcations, the note is invalid as to the defend-
ant, W. S. Berryessa, and you must so find. 
The burden of proof is on the defendant in 
this case to prove that the consideration for which 
the defendant signed the note was the suppres-
sion of a criminal prosecution against defend-
ant's son.'' 
We do not understand that plaintiff contends that 
that portion of such instructions as follows: 
"You are instructed that the note sued upon 
by the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant 
W. S. Berryessa if not supported by a valuable 
consideration. A promissory note given for the 
suppression of a criminal prosecution is against 
public policy and cannot be enforced between 
the parties and it is immaterial whether the in-
dividual as to whom the criminal prosecution 
is suppressed was guilty or innocent.'' 
incorrectly states the law, but rather, in plaintiff's 
own words (page 25 of its brief): 
''It gives the jury the idea that there are two 
separate and distinct defenses to the validity of 
the transaction: One, duress, and the other, fail-
ure of consideration, and the Court specifically 
tells the jury that if either of these defenses is 
established by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the plaintiff cannot recover. In other words, the 
Court, by this instruction and that portion of 
Instruction No. 6 gives to the jury the idea that 
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even though duress is not proven, yet the jury 
may still bring in a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant for want of consideration." 
We submit that the issue of want of consideration, 
as well as of duress, in the signing of the note was pro-
perly submitted to the jury. The defense of want of 
consideration was specifically pleaded as a defense 
(Paragraph 9 of Defendant's Answer, Tr. 005) and 
there was evidence to support it. 
In considering this phase of the matter it should 
be borne in mind that defendant claims there were two 
things done that induced him to sign the note. The 
first is that plaintiff's agent threatened that if the 
note was not signed, Frank would be criminally prose-
cuted. This is the duress. The second is that plain-
tiff's agent promised that if the note was signed Frank 
would not be criminally prosecuted. This is the illegal 
consideration. They are separte and distinct. The 
jury might find that the threat was not made, in which 
case the defense of duress was not sustained, but never-
theless find that the promise not to prosecute was made, 
in which case the note is still invalid because of the 
illegality of the consideration therefor. 
We refer first to the only case cited by plaintiff 
in support of its eontention of error on this point, Brane 
v. First National Bank (Kan.) 20 P. (2) 506. This 
case did not in anywise involve instructions or sub-
mission of defenses to the jury, but on the contrary 
went up on demurrer and involved only the question 
of whether the eomplaint stated a cause of action in 
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"that if the plaintiff would pay or secure said 
defendant the sum of $4,000, that said defend-
ant would accept same in full settlement of the 
claim ag-ainst said son-in-law, and that the pay-
ment and security of the same would protect 
said son-in-law from criminal prosecution.'' 
The court held that this did not state a cause of 
action in duress, saying: 
''Does this contain the threat necessary to con-
stitute duress~ It contains no threat whatever, 
unless the negative is to be inferred from the 
last clause, that, if the payment and security are 
not made and furnished, the son-in-law would 
be prosecuted criminally. Inferences from facts 
pleaded are not generally substitutes for neces-
sary allegations.'' 
In the present case both the defense of duress and 
of lack of consideration were pleaded, and evidence 
offered on both. They were separate and distinct, and 
each, in and of itself, sufficient. The pleading of these 
separate defenses was proper under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 8 (c) provides : 
''(c) Affirmative Defense. In pleading to 
a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitra-
tion and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, es-
toppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, pay-
ment, release, resjudicata, statute of frauds, sta-
tute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or a£firm)ltive de-
fense". (italics added) 
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Rule 8 (c) (2) provides: 
"(2) A party may set forth two or more 
statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypotheticaily, either in one count or defense or 
in separate counts or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in the alternative and 
one of them if made independently would be suf-
ficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by 
the insufficiency of one or more of the alterna-
tive statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or 
on equitable grounds or on both.'' 
As we have previously seen, if the promise not to 
prosecute forms any part of the consideration it is 
immaterial that there may be other consideration of 
a legal nature. 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page 630: 
"If an agreement not to prosecute criminally 
forms any part of the consideration, it is im-
material that there was an existing indebtedness 
which could have been a consideration for the 
instrument, as where the bill or note was given 
for money embezzled or stolen by the maker.'' 
Also Kirkland v. Benjamin (Ark.) 55 8. W. 840 
Buck v. Paw Paw First National Bank (Mich.) 
27 Mich. 293, 15 Am. Rep. 189 
Swinburne v. Dahms (Ohio) 162 N. E. 776 
Ogden v. Ford (Calif.) 176 P. 165. 
The case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
v. Charles, et al, (Ala.) 31 So. 588, is on all fours fact-
ually with this case. We quote from the opinion: 
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''The first and third pleas, to which demur-
rers were interposed by plaintiff and overruled 
by the court, set up the illegality of the consi-
deration of the notes sued on. These pleas aver 
that the notes were given in consideration of an 
agreement and promise made by the payee not 
to prosecute the principal maker of said notes, 
viz., one Caldwell, for the embezzlement by him 
of $650 from the Standard Building & Loan Asso-
ciation of Montgomery, Ala., in the employment 
of which company he was engaged as a book-
keeper. It is further shown by said pleas that 
the payee guaranty company was security upon 
the employment bond of said Caldwell at the time 
of said embezzlement by him, and as such surety 
paid to said building and loan association the 
sum so embezzled. That there was an implied 
contract, under the law, on the part of Caldwell, 
to pay to the said guaranty company the amount 
so paid by it to the building and loan association 
for his said default, there can be no doubt, and 
that upon such implied contract a right of action 
existed and a recovery could be had by the guar-
anty company against said Caldwell is equally 
clear, but that is not the contract here sued 
upon. The contract sued upon is an express con-
tract made by said Caldwell, together with the 
defendants as his sureties, which is based upon 
a consideration which is, at least in part, illegal. 
It is contended by counsel for appellant that the 
only difference between the contract implied by 
law and the express contract sued upon is one of 
evidence. In this contention appellant's counsel 
is mistaken. The express contract, besides car-
rying with it the obligation of the defendants 
as sureties, also provides for a waiver of exemp-
tions, neither of which existed in the implied con-
tract. The plaintiff, in his action, relies wholly 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon the express eontract, and upon it he must 
stand or fall, without any regard to the implied 
contract which the law raised up between plain-
tiff and the principal debtor out of the circum-
stances of the default and embezzlement. It is 
a well-settled principle of law that a considera-
tion in part illegal will avoid the entire contract. 
1 Brick. Dig. p. 382, Sec. 116, and cases there 
cited. The fact that there was a contractual re-
lation existing between Caldwell and the guar-
anty company, by virtue of the latter's surety-
ship upon a bond for the faithful performance 
of duty by Caldwell to his employer, the Stan-
dard Building & Loan Association, cannot vary 
the principle laid down in the authorities above 
cited, or purge the contract of the illegality of 
consideration. When the guaranty company paid 
the amount of the default to the loan company, 
it then occupied the same relation to the embezz-
ler, as to an implied promise by him to refund, 
as existed between the embezzler and the loan 
company, from whom he embezzled the- funds, 
before said guaranty company settled the defal-
cation. It is the promise, as an inducement to 
the contract sued upon, that the payee will abstain 
from criminal prosecution of the principal maker, 
that taints the consideration of the note; being 
opposed to public policy and offensive to the 
law." 
We submit, accordingly, that the lower court not 
only did not err in submitting both of defendant's affirm-
ative defenses to the jury, but it would have been error 
for it not to have done so. 
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Page 458: 
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''A court instructing the jury may not ignore 
or withdraw from the jury issues of fact which 
are in the case and supported by evidence, a 
ground of liability, or a proper defense." 
And on page 460: 
''Each party to an action is entitled to an 
instruction upon his theory of the cases if there 
is evidence to sustain it." 
POINT VI 
Plaintiff's sixth point is that the lower court erred 
in refusing to give its requested instructions Nos. 1 and 
2, which were in effect for a directed verdict. We have 
heretofore demonstrated that there was competent evi-
dence to the effect that the note was obtained as a con-
sequence of the duress and illegal promise of the plain-
tiff's agent, Hagman, and the $1,500 payment made and 
the $500 check given under the same circumstances. 
This raised issues of fact, and their submission to the 
jury was proper. 
Plaintiff further contends that the court in giving 
its Instruction No. 4, by which it defined duress, and 
which was word-for-word plaintiff's definition of duress 
as submited in its Request No. 3, it erred in om.ijtting 
the purely gratuitous observation requested by plain-
tiff as follows: 
''Duress will not ordinarily invalidate a pro-
missory note entered into after opportunity for 
deliberate action". 
The court not only did not err in leaving that state-
ment out of its instructions, but we submit it would have 
been error to have included it. The question was whether 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
duress as defined by the court was operating upon 
the defendant at the time the note was signed and the 
payment made. That question the jury had to deter-
mine. For the court to suggest to the jury by this state-
ment that duress was not here present would have con-
stituted an usarpation of the jury's province, and been 
error. Wbether duress "ordinarily" will or will not 
invalidate a note entered into after an opportunity for 
deliberation is purely argumentative, and it is funda-
mental that argument has no place in an instruction. 
53 Am. J ur ., Trial, Page 439 : 
''Argument, which lies properly within the 
domain of counsel in the case, finds no place in 
instructions of the court. A court should not give, 
and may properly refuse, argumentative instruc-
tions.'' 
Plaintiff also contends that the lower court erred 
in refusing to give its Requested Instruction No. 6, al-
though conceding that is was partially covered by the 
court's instruction No. 5. The court's instruction No. 
5 is as follows : 
"No. 5. 
You are further instructed that even though 
you should believe, by a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case, that at some time previous 
to the execution of the promissory note, the pay-
ment of one thousand five hundred ($1,500.00) 
dollars, and the giving of the personal check for 
five hundred ($500.00) Dollars, the said Hagman 
did make threats to initiate criminal prosecu-
tion of defendant's son and that the same con-
stituted duress as that term bas been heretofore 
defined, yet you must find for, the plaintiff in 
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this case unless you further believe, by prepon-
derance of the evidence, that said duress, if you 
should find as a fact that there was duress, existed 
and continued to exist over the mind of the de-
fendant at the time he actually signed the said 
note and the time he paid the one thousand five 
hundred ($1,500.00) dollars, and the giving of 
the check for five hundred ($500.00) dollars.'' 
By this instruction the court clearly and with cer-
tainly advised the jury that the defendant could recover 
his $1,500 and $500 check only by proving hy a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the same was paid and deli-
vered over under duress then present and operative. 
Having so stated it in the affirmative, we do not con-
ceive it to be error for the court to have omitted to state 
the same principle in the negative, which is all plain-
tiff's Request No. 6 called for in addition to that given. 
As stated in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Page 444: 
''Instructions should not he repeated, since 
the tendency is to mislead and confuse the jury 
by placing undue emphasis on particular points, 
but a violation of the rule is not reversible error 
unless it reasonbly appears that the jury was 
misled. Statements of law should not be given 
undue prominence by repetition or otherwise.'' 
Plaintiff further contends that the lower court erred 
in refusing to give its Request No. 7 to the effect that 
''if you should further find from the evidence in 
this case that the defendant W. S. Berryessa 
thereafter, and after any threat of duress had 
been removed, voluntarily made a payment of 
$50.00 on said obligation, then I instruct you that 
such payment, if freely and voluntarily made, 
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would constitute a waiver of his defense of du-
ress and your verdict should be in favor of the 
plaintiff.'' 
The principle of law thus offered to the court is to 
the effect that the subsequent $50.00 payment, if volun-
tarily made, would not only in and of itself not be re-
coverable, but would validate the entire transaction, that 
is, the signing of the note, the paying of the $1,500, and 
the delivery of the check. Insofar as recovery of the 
$50.00 itself is involved, we are not here concerned with 
it, because the court did not submit it to the jury, and 
the defendant lost as to it. As to the proposition that 
the $50.00 payment, if voluntarily made, would validate 
the remaining transactions consummated under duress, 
we submit that such is not the law and the requested 
instruction is bad. It should he horne in mind that 
there were really two tranactions, although all grow-
ing out of the June 4th meeting, namely, the signing of 
the note for $4,865.20, and the later payment of $1,500 
and the delivery of the $500 check, which were not on 
account of the note, but over and above the amount 
thereof. Assuming that the note was signed, the $1,500 
was paid, and the check delivered, all under duress, a 
subsequent voluntary payment on the note could not 
under any circustances he deemed a waiver of the duress 
insofar as the $1,500 and the check is concerned. This 
in and of itself rendered the instruction bad in toto. 
An equally fundamental reason why the request 
states bad law, is that it is predicated upon the assump-
tion that the note, if obtained by the duress or upon the 
consideration claimed by defendant, is merely voidable, 
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and thus subject to validation through subsequent con-
duct by the defendant that would constitute a waiver 
of the defense. 
We do not dispute that contracts obtained under 
certain types of duress, or upon certain illegal consider-
ations may be only Yoidable, but such is not the case 
where the duress is the threat of a criminal prosecu-
tion, or the consideration the suppression of a crime 
through a promise not to. prosecute. Under those cir-
cumstances the contract is void, not voidable, because 
contrary to public policy, and thus cannot be ratified 
through subsequent conduct. 
7 Am. J ur., Bills and Notes, Page 968: 
''Thus a bill or note given to repay embezzled 
money in consideration of an agreement, express 
or implied, to conceal the emb€zzlement, not to 
prosecute, or to stifle the prosecution is void.'' 
10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, Page 628 : 
''As between the immediate parties or their 
privies, a bill or note founded upon an illegal 
consideration * * * is void and unenforceable.'' 
and at Page 630: 
''Bills and notes for the concealment of a 
crime or the suppression or hindering of a crim-
inal prosecution are against public policy and 
cannot be enforced between the immediate parties, 
whether the maker was innocent or guilty.'' 
Henry v. State Bank of Laurens (Ia.) 107 N. W. 1034: 
''Moreover, if the note and deed were void 
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because contrary to public policy, their delivery 
even without duress would not make them valid. 
This is hornbook law requiring no citation of 
authorities in its support.'' 
POINT VII 
Plaintiff's final point is that the lower court erred 
in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. This, we feel, has been fully and 
completely covered elsewhere in this brief, and the lower 
court did not err in this regard. 
CONCLUSIOIN 
For the reasons hereinabove set out, it is submitted 
that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWEL·L, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
W. S. Berryessa 
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